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INTRODUCTION
In federal habeas corpus proceedings, Earl Matthews, an African
American, South Carolina death row inmate, alleged that his death
sentence was the result of invidious racial discrimination that violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To sup-
port his contention, Matthews presented statistical evidence showing
that in Charleston County, where ajury convicted him and sentenced
him to death, the prosecutor was far more likely to seek a death sen-
tence for a Black defendant accused of killing a white person than for
any other racial combination of victims and defendants, and also that
such a Black defendant was more likely to receive a death sentence.
The statistics proffered by Matthews did not stand alone. Testimony
from former Charleston County police officers, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and community leaders bolstered these statistics and indi-
cated that racial considerations affected the prosecution of capital
cases in Charleston County. Matthews also presented, as is commonly
done in other types of antidiscrimination suits, additional circumstan-
tial evidence of racial discrimination, including information sug-
gesting that certain hiring and firing practices and other prosecutorial
actions in his case were motivated by racial animus.
One, of course, may disbelieve this evidence of racial animus.
The court, however, did not assess the truthfulness of Matthews's alle-
gations. Rather, the federal district court judge summarily dismissed
Matthews's contentions on the ground that the Supreme Court's deci-
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sion in McCleskey v. Kemp' precluded this type of challenge to a death
sentence.2 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, 3 and the State of South Carolina executed
Matthews on November 6, 1997.
Although McCleskey has been widely criticized, 4 this Article does
not address its correctness. Rather, our analysis addresses flaws in the
lower courts' treatment of post-McCleskey selective-prosecution claims.
Any plausible reading of McCleskey suggests that Matthews's race-based
claims warranted more serious treatment than the federal courts af-
forded them.
Our review of the published post-McCleskey decisions reveals that
the abbreviated treatment of Matthews's claim is not unique. Many
courts that face post-McCleskey capital-sentencing racial discrimination
claims may assume that McCleskey dooms them all.5 Although some
scholars have concluded understandably that McCleskey precludes all
statistically based attacks involving racial bias and the death penalty,6
McCleskey does not hold on its face that selective-prosecution claims
are not cognizable in capital cases. In any other equal protection con-
text, the showings made in many post-McCleskey cases would have trig-
gered, at a minimum, the opposing party's duty to rebut the prima
facie case of racial discrimination. When lower courts, without exami-
nation, reject such prosecutor-specific proof of discrimination simply
because a death row inmate-whose claims one might assume should
receive more judicial scrutiny rather than less7-proffers it, they dis-
1 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Court rejected McCleskey's Equal Protection Clause and
Eighth Amendment challenges to his death sentence because the statewide statistical study,
which Dr. David Baldus had conducted, did not provide specific evidence that any of the
"decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose." Id. at 292, 298. Part I of
this Article will discuss the Court's decision in McCleskey in detail.
2 See Matthews v. Evatt, No. G/A 3:95-132-3BC, slip op. at 13-14 (D.S.C. Mar. 25,
1996).
3 See Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1997).
4 See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDus Er AL., EQUAL JUsTCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 370-93
(1990); SAMUEL P. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DIsCRIMINATION: RACIAL DIsPARI-
TIES IN CAPrrAL SENTENCING 159-211 (1989); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and
Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 433, 480 (1995) (referring to McCleskey as a "badge of shame upon America's sys-
tem ofjustice"); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 ComRtE.
L. REv. 1016, 1016 (1988); Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference:
Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in CriminalJustice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 509, 510 (1994).
Even McCleskey's author, Justice Powell, came to wish that he could change his deciding
vote in that case. See David Von Drehle, Retired Justice Changes Stand on Death Penalty, WASH.
Posr, June 10, 1994, at Al.
5 See infra Part II.
6 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Discrimination
in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 359, 374 (1994).
7 The Court has noted that "[b]ecause of that qualitative difference [of the death
penalty], there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determina-
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tort McCleskey in a manner that cannot be squared with generally ap-
plicable equal protection doctrine.
Part I describes the historical background of capital-sentencing
racial discrimination claims and then discusses those types of discrimi-
nation claims that McCleskey did, and did not, foreclose. Part II
presents the evidence of racial discrimination in the decision to seek
death in two South Carolina capital cases, including the Matthews
case, and describes the perfunctory way courts treated this evidence.
It then summarizes how similar attacks have fared in other jurisdic-
tions. Part III contrasts the adjudication of these cases with the dispo-
sition of analogous issues in other types of discrimination claims. Part
IV outlines an approach to capital-sentencing racial discrimination
claims that both comports with well-established equal protection stan-
dards and is consistent with McCleskey.
I
RACE, THE DEATH PENALTY, AND NORMAL EQUAL
PROTECTION STANDARDS
A. The Road to McCleskey
There is no question that both the historical and the current im-
position of the death penalty in this country are racially discrimina-
tory. Nearly every study, including the federal government's General
Accounting Office review of twenty-eight studies, has come to this con-
clusion.8 The "distorting effects of racial discrimination" in the ad-
ministration of the death penalty are, in truth, as old as our Republic. 9
tion that death is the appropriate punishment." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.). Commentators have described
this supposed heightened scrutiny as "super due process." See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin,
Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143
(1980); cf. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 338-43 (outlining
various procedural due process issues specific to capital cases).
8 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATED
PATTERN OF RACIAL DIspARITIEs 3 (1990). The GAO study refers to many of the most rele-
vant studies. See id. at app. I. For other studies on death penalty sentencing, see BALDus ET
AL., supra note 4; GRoss & MAURO, supra note 4; Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce,
Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death Penalty in Florida, 43 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1991).
Significant racial disparity also has been apparent in the application of the federal death
penalty. See H.R. REP. No. 103-458, at 2-4 (1994). Stephen P. Klein and John E. Rolph,
however, report no statistically significant race effect. See Stephen P. Klein & John E.
Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32
JURIMETRICS 33, 43 (1991). But they do find that white-victim cases are more likely to result
in death sentences than nonwhite-victim cases. See id. at 37-38. This effect survives after
controlling for case characteristics. See id. at 43. Klein and Rolph do not break down the
nonwhite category into Black people and other nonwhites.
9 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 439 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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This long history of the relationship between race and capital cases
also has been well-documented elsewhere.' 0
By 1972, however, the Supreme Court seemed ready to face the
many inequities of capital punishment. Indeed, concern that race in-
fluences who lives and who dies was perhaps the most significant fac-
tor in the Court's decision to overturn all then-existing death penalty
statutes in Furman v. Georgia." Justice Douglas decried the wide dis-
cretion ofjudges and juries in imposing the death penalty. He argued
that this discretion was often responsible for "feeding prejudices
against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political
clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and
[for] saving those who by social position may be in a more protected
position."' 2 Justice Marshall discussed the history of racial discrimina-
tion at length in his opinion, noting that "[n] egroes [have been] exe-
cuted far more often than whites in proportion to their percentage of
the population."' 3 EvenJustice Stewart noted that "if any basis can be
discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the
constitutionally impermissible basis of race."' 4
Even when the Court upheld death penalty statutes in Gregg v.
Georgia,'5 its reasoning was consistent with Furman's concerns about
racial discrimination. In the plurality's view, the new statutes suffi-
ciently channeled the sentencer's discretion to eliminate the possibil-
ity of an arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty.16
Gregg acknowledged the possibility that race may influence capital
punishment, even under the new "guided discretion" statutes, but be-
cause the litigants had not presented proof that discrimination per-
sisted, the Court upheld these statutes.' 7 Moreover, one year after the
decision in Gregg, the Court struck down the death penalty for rape,' 8
which was notorious for the extremity of its racial imbalance.' 9
Although the Court did not discuss race, observers believed that the
10 See, e.g., Bright, supra note 4, at 439-42.
11 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12 Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring)
("[I]t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the minority
group-the man who, because he is without means, and is defended by a court-appointed
attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial lamb ... " (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
13 Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
14 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
15 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
16 See id. at 206-07.
17 See id. at 200.
18 See Coker v. Gerwgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
19 See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that of the 455




likelihood of racial discrimination was the key motivating factor in the
Court's decision to invalidate the death penalty for rape.
Many litigators and academics therefore believed that Gregg
presented them with the opportunity to demonstrate that race re-
mained an important factor in the administration of capital punish-
ment.20 The next decade produced many statistical studies showing
that race-both of the defendant and the victim-had played a signifi-
cant role in the administration of the death penalty.21 These studies
included that of Dr. David Baldus of the University of Iowa.
B. McCleskey v. Kemp
Baldus's study examined over 2,000 murders that occurred in
Georgia during the 1970s. After considering 230 variables that could
have explained the data on nonracial grounds, Baldus concluded that
defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more
likely to receive the death penalty than defendants charged with kill-
ing African Americans, and that Black defendants were 1.1 times more
likely to receive the death penalty than other defendants. 22 Thus, a
Black defendant who had killed a white victim had the greatest likeli-
hood of receiving a death sentence. 23
Warren McCleskey was just such a defendant; indeed, as Justice
Brennan stated in dissent, Baldus's statistical analysis showed that "the
jury more likely than not would have spared McCleskey's life had his
victim been black."24 McCleskey's case was a particularly appropriate
vehicle for the Supreme Court to address racial disparities under post-
Furman statutes, both because the case arose from Georgia (as had
Furman and Gregg) and because it involved a comprehensive statistical
study by a respected statistician who held no ties to the anti-death
penalty community.
A bare majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell,
affirmed the court of appeals's rejection of McCleskey's claim. The
majority held that general statistical evidence showing that a particu-
lar state's capital punishment scheme operated in a discriminatory
manner did not establish either an Eighth or a Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation. 25 The Court found that Professor Baldus's study es-
tablished "[a] t most ... a discrepancy that appears to correlate with
20 See BALDUS ET AL.., supra note 4, at 27.
21 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at app. I (listing studies).
22 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987). The raw data indicate that the
death-sentencing rate for all white-victim cases was 11 times greater than the rate for Black-
victim cases. See id. at 326-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23 See id. at 286-87.
24 Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25 See id. at 291-92, 308.
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race,"26 and it then refused "to assume that what is unexplained is
invidious."27 Because the Court previously had found that statistics
alone presented sufficient proof of discriminatory intent, Justice Pow-
ell had to distinguish certain prior cases. Ordinarily, he stated, statisti-
cal disparities must be "stark" to provide sole proof of
discrimination. 28 Thus, Powell apparently viewed McCleskey as present-
ing a less than "stark" showing. Injury selection cases, however, the
Court had accepted less-extreme statistical disparities as sufficient to
shift the burden of proof to the government. These cases, Powell ex-
plained, had involved less complicated decisions and fewer decision
makers.29 Powell reasoned that the larger number of actors and as-
pects involved in the capital-sentencing process would increase the
likelihood that other factors were responsible for racial effects, and
therefore render the jury selection precedents inapplicable.30 More-
over, he noted that this complexity would have intolerably increased
the rebuttal burden if the State were required to explain the statewide
statistics that McCleskey had proffered.A'
Because McCleskey's proof neither constituted a stark statistical
pattern nor warranted departure from the stark-pattern standard, the
Court dismissed the statewide statistics as "clearly insufficient to sup-
port an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case
acted with discriminatory purpose. '3 2 The only other evidence of ra-
cial discrimination that McCleskey proffered was historical. Although
the evidence of past race-consciousness in the Georgia criminal justice
system was extensive, the Court found that because this evidence
lacked recency, it had little probative value in assessing the likelihood
of post-Furman discrimination.3 3 Thus, McCleskey had "offer[ed] no
evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that
racial considerations played a part in his sentence. '3 4 He therefore
failed to demonstrate a violation of either the Equal Protection Clause
or the Eighth Amendment.
3
26 Id. at 312. The majority opinion states that "[elven a sophisticated multiple-regres-
sion analysis such as the Baldus study can only demonstrate a risk that the factor of race
entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily lesser risk that race en-
tered into any particular sentencing decision." Id. at 291 n.7.
27 Id. at 313.
28 Id. at 293.
29 See id. at 294.
30 See id. at 294-95.
31 See id. at 296-97.
32 Id. at 297.
33 See id. at 298 n.20.
34 Id. at 292-93.
35 See id. at 297. The majority opinion is somewhat unclear as to whom the relevant
decisionmaker is: the jury that sentences the defendant to death, the prosecutor who
makes the decision to seek the death penalty, or both. However, the passage above, see
supra text accompanying note 32, seems to indicate that if either the jury or the prosecu-
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C. The Limits of McCleskey
McCleskey does not state precisely the limits of its holding. There
are, however, compelling reasons to read it narrowly, and no legiti-
mate reason to read it as broadly as the lower courts have done. Most
probative is McCleskey's statement, in the very first paragraph of its
analysis of the equal protection claim, that the flaw in McCleskey's
showing turned on the absence of evidence tying alleged racial dis-
crimination to his case: " [T] hus, to prevail under the Equal Protection
Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted
with discriminatory purpose. He offers no evidence specific to his own
case that would support an inference that racial considerations played
a part in his sentence."3 6 McCleskey does not support creating insur-
mountable evidentiary hurdles in capital cases in which race may have
played a role in the decision to seek the death penalty. It also does
not reject completely statistical analyses of this issue. McCleskey pur-
ports to be rooted in and consistent with standard equal protection
analysis.
The Court's first paragraph analyzing McCleskey's claim contains
a second reason to limit the reach of its holding. The Court obviously
and properly was concerned about the implications of accepting Mc-
Cleskey's proof without some evidence tying the alleged discrimina-
tion to his case:
McCleskey argues that the Baldus study compels an inference that
his sentence rests on purposeful discrimination. McCleskey's claim
that these statistics are sufficient proof of discrimination, without
regard to the facts of a particular case, would extend to all capital
cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defen-
dant is black.3
7
Thus, the Court feared that ruling for McCleskey on the basis of the
Baldus study would threaten the validity of a large class of capital cases
throughout Georgia. Because there was little reason to think that
other defendants could not replicate the Baldus study in cases in
other states (as likely would have been done had McCleskey pre-
vailed), McCleskey's claim endangered at least hundreds of what
might otherwise be valid capital convictions and sentences. As the
Court stated in McCleskey, "McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical con-
clusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our
tor's decision to seek or to impose the death sentence was affected by race, an equal pro-
tection violation would have occurred. As a common-sense matter, this view must be
correct. Imagine, for example, a prosecutor who announces that his policy is that he only
seeks the death penalty in cases involving Black defendants and white victims. Would the
fact that a nonracially biased jury imposed the death sentence insulate the sentence from
constitutional challenge? To ask the question is to answer it.
36 Id. at 292-93 (additional emphasis added).
37 Id. at 293.
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entire criminal justice system. ' 38 Once a capital defendant offers
proof tying discrimination to his case, this concern dramatically de-
creases. At most, this proof implicates the past convictions of a single
prosecutor or a single prosecutor's office.
A third reason to read McCleskey narrowly lies in what we now
know about the Court's consideration-and rejection-of a broad
prohibition against racial discrimination challenges to death
sentences. Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers reveal a McCleskey case
memorandum fromJustice Scalia indicating that the latter would hold
that no showing of racial discrimination in the death-sentencing pro-
cess-no matter how strong or direct-would violate the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Scalia did not mean to say that he
believed that race played no role in capital-sentencing decisions.
Rather, his memorandum states that "'it is my view.., that the uncon-
scious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including
racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial [decisions], is
real, acknowledged by the [decisions] of this court and ineradicable, I
cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof.' ' 39 Justice Scalia, it
appears, might have been prepared to acknowledge the existence of
racial discrimination but also would deem its presence to be of no
legal consequence. Clearly, the majority eschewed this course. In-
deed, only five members of the Court were of the view that McCles-
key's evidence itself was insufficient to establish a constitutional
violation, and one of them, the author of the majority opinion, has
since regretted his vote.40 Thus, because McCleskey itself is of doubtfufl
stability, inferring support for an expansive holding surely is
unwarranted.
With respect to racial discrimination claims that focus on the ac-
tions of the prosecutor, a fourth reason indicates that McCleskey erects
no implicit bar. In United States v. Armstrong,41 the Court recognized
that allegations of selective prosecution based on race-clearly the ge-
nus of the challenge that Earl Matthews had presented-must be eval-
uated in light of "ordinary equal protection standards. '42 In short, no
38 Id. at 314-15.
39 Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the
Perspective ofJustice Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1035, 1038
(1994) (quoting Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Antonin Scalia in No. 84-
6811-McClesey v. Kemp of Jan. 6, 1987, McCleskey v. Kemp file, in THURGOOD MARSHALL
PAERS (on file with Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). See generally Dorin, supra (dis-
cussing Scalia's memorandum and the impact on McCleskey).
40 See Von Drehle, supra note 4, at Al.
41 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
42 Id. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hunter v. Undenvood, 471
U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (discussing the standard by which to evaluate racial impact); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) ("It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution
claims according to ordinary equal protection standards.").
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reason exists to believe that prosecutorial decisions to seek the death
penalty are exempt from the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause,
or that proof of racial discrimination in such decisions is subject to
peculiar rules.
D. Universally Applicable Equal Protection Principles
Under established equal protection principles, a death-sentenced
inmate need not prove discriminatory intent by direct evidence.
Rather, as the Supreme Court stated in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Division Corporation,43 "invidious discriminatory purpose
may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."44 Thus,
the appropriate analysis "demands a sensitive inquiry into such cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."45 Sen-
sitive inquiry is necessary both because perpetrators do not often
publicly announce race-based discrimination and because those re-
sponsible for key decisions may have "[m] ore subtle, less consciously
held racial attitudes. '46 These attitudes become especially problem-
atic when those responsible for the decision have broad discretion, as
in the decision to seek the death penalty.
47
The Arlington Heights Court identified several relevant factors to
consider in testing for discriminatory intent: "[t] he impact of the offi-
cial action," "[t] he historical background of the decision[,] ... partic-
ularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
purposes," "[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence,"
"substantive departures[,] ... particularly if the factors usually consid-
ered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision con-
trary to the one reached," and "contemporary statements by members
of the decisionmaking body."4 Arlington Heights also makes clear that
this list is not exhaustive.
49
II
POST-MCLFsKEYCASES IN THE LOWER COURTS
Far from conducting a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available,"' 50 most lower courts
reject post-McCleskey capital-sentencing racial discrimination claims
43 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
44 Id. at 266; see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
45 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
46 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 31 (1986).
47 See id at 35.
48 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-268; see also Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232 (stating that
Arlington Heights supplies the "proper analysis" for selective-prosecution claims).
49 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
50 Id. at 266.
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without any individualized analysis. Earl Matthews's and Raymond
Patterson's cases present especially egregious examples. We describe
these cases in some detail so that the reader may evaluate the persua-
siveness of the proffered evidence that race did influence the deci-
sions to seek death. They are, however, not isolated cases.
A. Earl Matthews
With McCleskey's strictures in mind, Matthews's attorneys es-
chewed state wide studies of discrimination and focused on the deci-
sion maker in Matthews's case: the Charleston County, South Carolina
Solicitor's Office and, in particular, Matthews's prosecutor. Matthews
supplemented his statistical showings with other evidence that Arling-
ton Heights deemed relevant: recent history of official actions taken for
an invidious purpose; contemporaneous racially conscious statements
by the decision-making body; examples of deviations from standard
procedures; and evidence of substantive departures from ordinary cri-
teria for death prosecutions. He also adduced proof of racially moti-
vated personnel policies and racial bias on the part of the key decision
maker in his case.
1. Evidence That Race Influenced the Decision to Seek the Death of
Earl Matthews
a. "The Impact of the Official Action": Statistical Evidence of
Racial Discrimination in Seeking the Death Penalty
Matthews's statistical study revealed that the prosecution had
gone to trial seeking the death penalty in twenty cases in Charleston
County since 1977, the year that South Carolina enacted its post-
Furman death penalty statute. Thirteen of these trials involved Black
or minority defendants, and all but two of the trials involved one or
more white victims.51 The study indicated that, at the time, there were
five individuals on South Carolina's death row who were tried for
crimes that occurred in Charleston County. Additionally, the State
recently had executed another prisoner from Charleston County.
Four of these persons were African American, 52 one was Native Ameri-
can,53 and only one was white.54 All of these cases involved one or
more white victims. The only persons to receive death sentences in
single-victim cases were Matthews, Leroy Drayton, and Anthony
51 The two trials actually involved the same defendant, Demetrius Gathers. The state
supreme court reversed Gathers's death sentence, State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144
(S.C. 1988), af'd, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) and resentenced him to life imprisonment.
52 These four were Matthews, Leroy Drayton, Frank Middleton, and Anthony Green.
53 The Native American was Joseph Ernest Atkins.
54 His name was Fred Kornahrens. He recently was executed.
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Green, all three of whom were African Americans convicted for mur-
dering white victims. In contrast, Fred Kornahrens, the only white
person from Charleston County who was recently on death row, was
convicted of killing three people. This racial pattern seems intuitively
improbable given that Charleston County is about thirty-four percent
Black.55 The pattern seems to focus disproportionately on Black-de-
fendant cases and white-victim cases.
Matthews presented a statistical study that tested this impression
by focusing on the effect that race had on the decision to seek the
death penalty and on the disposition of homicide cases in Charleston
County between January 1981 and January 1990.56 These years cover
a period roughly five years before and five years after Matthews's first
trial. The same prosecutor was in office throughout this period.
Between 1981 and 1990, the prosecutor sought the death penalty
in ten of twenty-five murder cases in which the defendant was Black
and the victim was white, but he only sought the death penalty in two
of seventy murder cases in which the defendant and victim were both
Black.57 Hence, when a Black person had killed a white person, the
prosecutor sought the death penalty forty percent of the time, but
when a Black person had killed another Black person, the same prose-
cutor only sought the death penalty 2.9% of the time. 58 Because such
a statistical discrepancy would occur by chance less than one time in
one thousand, Matthews's study presents prima facie evidence that the
race of defendants and victims played a significant role in the prosecu-
tor's decision to seek the death penalty.
59
During that same period of time, the prosecutor sought the death
penalty in twenty-one of sixty-five (32.3%) murder cases in which the
victim was white and only in four of seventy-seven (5.2%) murder
cases in which the victim was Black.60 Again, because this statistical
discrepancy only could occur by chance less than one time in one
thousand, the race of the victims likely played a significant factor in
the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty.61
Matthews's study also noted a strong relation between the race of
a homicide victim and whether the defendant received a "reduced
outcome." A reduced outcome occurs when (1) the jury convicts a
defendant of a level of homicide lower than the level of the most seri-
55 See BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1 1980 CENSUS OF THE POPU-
LATION A-42-15 (1981).
56 See 2 Joint Appendix at 526-31, Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1997) (on
file with Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
57 See id. at 527-28.
58 See id.
59 See id.




ous charge; (2) the jury convicts a defendant of a nonhomicide of-
fense; (3) the jury acquits the defendant; or (4) the prosecutor drops
the charges.62 When the victim was Black, the defendant received a
reduced outcome 78.2% of the time, whereas when the victim was
white, the defendant only received a reduced outcome 45.6% of the
time.63 Here, too, because this statistical discrepancy only could occur
by chance less than one time in one thousand, the race of the victims
likely played an important role in how the solicitor resolved homicide
cases. 64 The study concluded that in the absence of a persuasive ex-
planation for the highly suspect pattern, intentional racial discrimina-
tion existed in the administration of homicide and capital cases in
Charleston County.
65
b. Contemporary Statements by Members of the Decision-Making
Body
Matthews presented evidence from former employees of the So-
licitor's Office, from press accounts, and from community leaders to
corroborate the statistical evidence of racial bias. A former assistant
prosecutor in the Charleston County Solicitor's Office at the time of
Matthews's trial declared that the office had prosecuted homicide
cases in a racially discriminatory manner, treating cases involving
Black victims as less important than cases involving white victims.66
She worked in the prosecutor's office for six years, all during the solic-
itor's tenure, and only recalled one case involving a Black defendant
and a Black victim in which the solicitor sought the death penalty
even though there had been many such death eligible cases.67 In her
view, when there was an aggravated murder involving a Black defen-
dant and Black victim, "the idea of the state seeking the death penalty
did not appear to enter the calculus" at the Solicitor's Office.68 An-
other former prosecutor also observed a significant amount of racism
62 Id. at 530.
63 See id. at 530-31.
64 See id. at 531.
65 See i&
66 See id. at 561.
67 See id.
68 Id. In fact, in many death eligible cases in which the victim was Black, the staff
attorney observed the prosecutor allowing defendants to plead guilty to substantially lesser
charges even if the victims' families demanded stiffer penalties. See id. According to this
former assistant prosecutor, this racially discriminatory prosecution "reflected a perception
on the part of the Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office that the victims in cases [in which the
victims were black] were worth less than victims in cases of different racial makeups." Id.
Another employee of the solicitor's office, who was employed from 1988 to 1994, also
testified that she observed discrimination in the prosecution of cases, especially in regard
to sentencing. In her opinion, white defendants received "more lenient treatment," even




in the prosecutor's office during the time of both Matthews's trials.6 9
On one occasion, she heard another prosecutor in the office say at a
staff meeting that a particular case deserved less priority "because the
victim was just a little old black man."' 70
A twenty-five year veteran of the Charleston Police Department
(1966-1991) and current United States Marshall was the lead detective
in the Matthews case.71 He also worked numerous other homicide
cases and thus had constant contact with the Solicitor's Office.72 He
observed that the prosecutor's office "routinely sought tougher
sentences for black defendants than it did for white defendants. 73
He maintained that the solicitor prosecuted cases more seriously and
aggressively when the victim was white than when the victim was
Black:74 "when the defendant was black and/or the victim was white,
[the Solicitor's Office] would charge the accused with a more serious
offense and seek a greater punishment than was the case when the
defendant was white and/or the victim was black."75
c. Departures from the Normal Procedural Sequence
Attorneys, civil rights and community leaders, and journalists pro-
vided additional corroboration of racial discrimination in the decision
to seek death. Although some of this evidence tracked the statistical
findings, it also added depth by providing examples of departures
from the Solicitor's Office's normal procedures in seeking death. Tes-
timony indicated that the Charleston County Solicitor's Office rou-
tinely had prosecuted cases involving white victims, especially
homicide cases, more aggressively than cases involving Black victims.76
Testimony also showed that the office had sought resolutions more
69 See 2 id. at 548.
70 Id.





76 A local minister complained that "[a] black can kill a black and nothing is done,
but only when a white is killed by a black is someone prosecuted." Shirley Greene & Steve
Mullins, Charges of Police Brutality Spark Groundswell of Protes NEws & COURIER-EvENING
PosT (Charleston, S.C.), May 15, 1983, at 1-A (internal quotation marks omitted). Nelson
B. Rivers III, former president of the North Charleston NAACP branch, said in reference
to a case in which a black person was accused of killing a white person that "[t]he whole
situation reinforces the feeling that if you are black and accused of killing a white, you
can't get a fair trial in this community." Id. at 2-A (internal quotation marks omitted). In
regard to another case in which the prosecutor filed no charges against two white people
who killed a Black person, Rev. Jerry Williams protested that "[i]f you turn this around"
and, under the same circumstances, two Black people kill a white person, the Blacks would
"quickly be locked up." David W. MacDougall, Ford, Others Want Investigation in Mungin
Shooting to Continue, PosT & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), May 8, 1992, at 1-B (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). The Solicitor's Office ultimately decided not to prosecute the
1784 [Vol. 83:1771
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quickly when the victim had been white. 77 Other testimony estab-
lished that differences in the decision to seek death were not attributa-
ble to differences in the victims' families' preferences; in many death-
eligible cases involving Black victims, the prosecutor allowed defend-
ants to plead guilty to substantially lesser charges even though the vic-
tims' families had demanded stiffer penalties. 78 Moreover, the
discriminatory treatment extended not only to bond issues and to plea
bargaining decisions, 79 but also to resource allocation decisions.80
d. Part of the Historical Background of the Decision: Racially
Discriminatory Employment Practices
Evidence of the solicitor's racially discriminatory attitude and de-
cisions extended to the personnel policies that determined the staff
who would participate in decisions about seeking death. Former em-
ployees maintained that "very few blacks [had been hired as] part of
the professional staff at the Solicitor's office," but Black people "al-
most exclusively [had been] hired ... as part of the support staff."8'
Testimony also suggested that Blacks had been "routinely fired ...
often for apparently no justifiable reason."82 This routine firing, how-
ever, "was not equally practiced against whites. 8s3 Evidence also indi-
cated that Black employees faced discrimination in the area of
promotions. 84 One witness maintained that Black people "were al-
most sure not to receive any promotions."85 Furthermore, evidence
whites involved in killing the Black victim. See Richard GreenJr., Brothers Won't Face Charges
for Shooting Suspect, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), May 28, 1992, at 1-B.
On another occasion, five white Citadel students, dressed in Ku Klux Klan-styled
robes, stormed into the room of a Black cadet, verbally harassed him, and left a burning
cross on his floor. Solicitor Condon concluded that "his office believed the cadets, if
found guilty, should be eligible for a program that will clear their records if they perform
... community service." 5 Citadel Cadets Indicted over Racial Hazing N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1987,
at A20; see also Herb Frazier, Hazing Lawsuit Is Settled Against 5 Ex-Citadel Cadets, NEws &
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.),Jan. 24, 1989, at 1-A (discussing the legal settlement that arose
from the aforementioned racial incident).
77 See 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 56, at 244.
78 See id. at 561.
79 See 1 id. at 245. The President of the local NAACP, as well as other NAACP mem-
bers, noticed the pattern of discriminatory prosecutorial decisions, especially in homicide
cases, and were prepared to discuss specific examples. They complained directly to Con-
don about his decisions, but he "showed little interest for their concerns." Id. at 248-49.
80 See id. at 244-45. For example, the prosecutor's office spent more money on ex-
perts and other aspects of the investigation in homicide cases with white victims than in
similar cases with Black victims. See id.
81 2 id. at 562; see 1 id. at 254-55.
82 2 id. at 562.
83 Id.
84 See 1 id. at 255-56.
85 2 id. at 562. One former assistant prosecutor filed racial discrimination claims with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See id. at 514. This former prosecutor
alleged that "[b]lack employees were treated differently than white employees and racially
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showed that Black employees were forced to perform a variety of me-
nial tasks, such as sweeping floors, even though such tasks were not in
their job descriptions.
8 6
e. Other Examples of the Prosecutor's Racial Bias
Other evidence demonstrated the solicitor's own racial insensitiv-
ity. For example, the solicitor blamed South Carolina's growing crime
problem on moral decay and the breakdown of values in the Black
community.8 7 Counsel also presented evidence regarding the solici-
tor's uncompromising support for flying the Confederate Battle Flag
on the Statehouse dome as indicative of his racism. The solicitor re-
sisted efforts to reach a compromise about the divisive issue and de-
clared that "[t]o even think about taking this flag down because it
offends certain people I think is contrary to pluralism in American
offensive comments were made in the office." Id. This differential and unfair treatment
that African Americans received in the Solicitor's Office prompted her to make verbal
protests. The office, however, did not appreciate her complaints, and she "was expected to
remain quiet and docile." Id. The office then asked her to resign. See id. Another Black
attorney in the office filed a racial discrimination claim against the Solicitor's Office with
the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission in 1991. See id. at 515. She maintained
that the office commonly treated African Americans differently than whites, and it often
made them feel unwanted. See id. She also noticed that "[wihites employed in the solici-
tor's office would commonly receive promotions easier and more frequently than equally
qualified blacks." Id. She recalled how she received a suspension without pay and earned
probation for her involvement in a verbal conflict with a white employee, see id., while the
white employee received no disciplinary sanction. See id. This differential treatment was
especially appalling because the white employee's racism provoked this conflict. See id.
While on probation, the Solicitor's Office continued its disrespectful practices by requiring
her to participate in offensive and degrading "counseling." Id. After she filed the com-
plaint, the office terminated her employment. See id. The Solicitor's Office later admitted
that she consistently had received excellent comments regarding her work. See id.
86 See 1 id. at 256. One cannot dismiss these declarations as the views of several dis-
gruntled former Black employees. A former white assistant solicitor noted the same une-
qual treatment and testified:
While working in the solicitor's office, I noticed that, on some occasions,
black employees were treated differently than whites. I also recall that
when the white attorneys in the office organized social events, blacks were
sometimes excluded. I clearly remember several occasions where I was in-
vited to office social functions while a particular fellow Assistant Solicitor
was not. Since my relationship to the organizers of these social events was
similar to that of this particular Assistant Solicitor's, I believed that the rea-
son for the different treatment was because I am white and she is black.
Because of this concern, I usually chose not to participate in these office
social functions.
2 id. at 549.
87 See Schuyler Kropf, Condon Urges Blacks to Action, Posr & COURIER (Charleston,
S.C.), Nov. 16, 1993, at 3-B.
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society."88 The solicitor urged opponents of the Confederate Flag to
deal with other issues and "leave this flag where it belongs."89
f. A Substantive Departure: The Anomaly of Seeking Death for Earl
Matthews
Although Matthews was death eligible, many of the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding his case could have led an unbiased decision
maker to decide that the death penalty was not an appropriate punish-
ment. First, Matthews was only nineteen at the time of the offense
and had a minimal prior record. In fact, one of his arresting officers
even stated that he was not a "hard-nosed" criminal. Second, the only
aggravator in this case-that the death occurred during an armed rob-
bery-hardly distinguished the case from other, similar homicides
that had occurred in the area and had not resulted in capital prosecu-
tions. Finally, the killing resulted from a "botched" robbery that Mat-
thews committed while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
The surviving victim remembered that Matthews became increasingly
nervous as the robbery progressed, did not speak clearly, seemed un-
educated, and acted like this was his first robbery.
2. The Cursory Judicial Review of Matthews's Claim
Given the statistical evidence of discrimination, the lengthy his-
tory of the prosecutor's antipathy toward African Americans, and the
lack of any compelling reason to select this case for death penalty
prosecution, one could easily have drawn the inference that racial bias
influenced the decision maker in Matthews's case. Nevertheless, a
federal district court rebuffed Matthews's claim. The judge did not
discuss any of the evidence that Matthews had presented, instead he
simply stated:
88 Sid Gaulden, Condon Supports Battle Flag, PosT & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Oct.
20, 1993, at 1-B. During his campaign for Attorney General, Matthews's prosecutor prom-
ised "to fight to keep the standard flying above the Statehouse." Id.
89 Id. Soon after becoming Attorney General, Matthews's prosecutor filed a memo-
randum in the South Carolina Supreme Court stating that the Confederate Flag had legal
authority to fly on the Statehouse dome. See Memorandum in Support of the State of
South Carolina and the Attorney General's Petition To Withdraw Its Brief at 2, Coble v.
South Carolina (S.C. 1995), reprinted in 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 56, at 546. The memo-
randum reversed the prior policy of the Attorney General's office. See id. Thus, rather
than simply adopting the State's existing position, or even supporting a compromise posi-
tion as the state legislature was contemplating, Matthews's prosecutor urged uncompromis-
ing support for the Confederate Flag.
The South Carolina Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil
Rights issued a report condemning the flying of the Confederate Flag at state facilities in
South Carolina. According to the report, "[t]he singular issue that has recently high-
lighted the severity of increased racial tensions is the flying of the Confederate Flag at State
facilities." SOUTH CAROLINA ADvisoRY Comm. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PER-
CEPTIONS OF RAcIAL TENSIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 21 (1995).
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The crux of the petitioner's claim is that the death penalty was
applied in a discriminatory fashion against him in violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses. Pursuant to [MeCleskey],
a defendant cannot question a prosecutor's discretionary decision
to pursue the death penalty in his case unless he can present a prima
fade case that discrimination has occurred. Relying on statistics will
not work because the petitioner must show that the decision in his
case was made for discriminatory reasons. "Thus, to prevail under
the Equal Protection Clause, [the petitioner] must prove that the
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."
In this case, the petitioner has pointed to no evidence or facts
that the solicitor sought the death penalty in his case for a discrimi-
natory purpose. In addition, the [McCleskey] Court indicated a re-
luctance to question the discretionary decisions of prosecutors and
stated that a legitimate explanation exists for seeking the death pen-
alty, that is, that the petitioner committed a crime for which the
laws permit the imposition of the death penalty. Such is the case
here as pursuant to the South Carolina death penalty statute, S.C.
Code § 16-3-20, et seq. (1976), a person convicted of murder shall be
punished by death or imprisonment for life. Thus, in recognition
of the solicitor's discretion, the violation of the statute, and the fail-
ure of the petitioner to show a prima fade case that discrimination
was the reason for the death penalty, his claim is rejected on the
merits and summary judgment should be entered for the
respondents. 90
Rather than discuss the evidence of discrimination that Matthews had
offered, the judge denied its existence. 9 1 However, the statement that
Matthews "pointed to no evidence or facts that the solicitor sought the
death penalty in his case for a discriminatory purpose"9 2 cannot be
squared with reality. Furthermore, the judge also denied Matthews's
motion for discovery that would have allowed a definitive exploration
of the troublesome pattern of race-linked behavior by Matthews's
prosecutor.
9 3
90 Matthews v. Evatt, No. C/A 3:95-132-3BC, slip op. at 13-14 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 1996)
(second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 292 (1987)), affd, 105 F.3d 907 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 102 (1997).
91 The circuit court deemed Matthews's racial discrimination claim to be procedurally
barred and declined to address the merits. Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F. 3d 907, 910 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 102 (1997).
92 Matthews, No. C/A 3:95-132-3BC, slip op. at 13.




1. Evidence That Race Influenced the Decision to Seek the Death of
Raymond Patterson
Raymond Patterson, an African American, received the death
penalty in a Lexington County, South Carolina trial for the armed
robbery and murder of Matthew Brooks, a white man from West Vir-
ginia. Evidence at trial showed that Patterson had attempted to mug
Brooks and his wife, Ruth Brooks. Mr. Brooks fought to stop the rob-
bery. In the ensuing scuffle, Patterson's gun discharged, killing Mr.
Brooks.
Prior to the trial, Patterson's counsel moved to prohibit the State
from seeking the death penalty because race had played a role in the
State's decision to seek death in the past.9 4 The court summarily de-
nied the motion. After the jury sentenced Patterson to death, counsel
renewed the motion because, while the jury had been deciding Patter-
son's fate, the trial court had accepted a guilty plea to murder from a
white defendant in a more heinous case. 95 The court again denied his
motion.96 On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court perfuncto-
rily rejected his claim. 97 Once one understands the statistical and an-
ecdotal evidence presented by the defense counsel, however, the state
Supreme Court's treatment of the claim seems especially
unsatisfactory.
a. Disparate Impact: The Statistical Evidence
Counsel noted that, in the past, the prosecution had sought the
death penalty in relatively unaggravated cases involving a Black defen-
dant and white victim.98 By contrast, counsel pointed out that cases
with white defendants are often more aggravated in that they involve
torture or multiple murder victims. 99 In addition to this anecdotal
94 SeeState v. Patterson, 482 S.E.2d 760, 767 (S.C.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 146 (1997).
95 See Transcript of Record at 2353-55, Patterson (No. 24549). The defendant, Leroy
Bolin, Jr., and an accomplice broke into a home and tied the inhabitants with duct tape.
When one of the burglary victims tried to escape, the defendant shot him with a shotgun.
Even though that white defendant was eligible for the death penalty or could have received
a life sentence without parole, the State agreed that he would be eligible for parole after
serving "only 20 years.
96 See id. at 2355.
97 See Patterson, 482 S.E.2d at 767.
98 For example, counsel indicated that the State had sought the death penalty against
J.D. Gleaton and Larry Gilbert, Black men who like Mr. Patterson received convictions for
killing a white man in the course of a robbery. See Motion to Prohibit Solicitor from Exer-
cising Peremptory Strikes Against African-Americans at 6, State v. Patterson, No. 93-GS-32-
2519 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1993).
99 For example, Tony Cooper and Robert Southerland received death sentences for
the kidnaping, torture, rape, and mutilation of a white woman. See State v. Southerland,
447 S.E.2d 862, 865 (S.C. 1994); State v. Cooper, 439 S.E.2d 276, 276 (S.C. 1994). Michael
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evidence, defense counsel offered a statistical study that reinforced
their conclusions.100 While there had been 174 homicide victims in
Lexington County since 1977, the State never had sought the death
penalty in a case involving a Black victim. 10 1 By contrast, the prosecu-
tion had issued a notice of intent to seek the death penalty in thirteen
of 128 cases (10.2%) in which the homicide victim had been white.
10 2
This pattern existed despite the fact that Blacks had comprised a dis-
proportionately higher percentage of homicide victims in Lexington
County. Although African Americans had constituted only eleven per-
cent of Lexington County's population, twenty-six percent (forty-four
of 172) of the homicide cases had involved Black victims.' 0 3 Thus, the
statistical evidence established that " [b] lacks are almost three times as
likely as whites to be the victims of homicide but prosecutors are more
aggressive in seeking punishment to protect white victims"' 0 4 and that
"[t] he most victimized group seems to be receiving the least protec-
tion, as measured by rates at which death was sought.'
u0 5
In addition to the anecdotal and statistical data about the relation
between race and the solicitor's death-seeking decisions, Patterson
presented other case-specific evidence of racially discriminatory be-
havior. The evidence included racist innuendo from the solicitor
prior to trial, the racist attitudes of the victim, and the solicitor's dispa-
rate treatment of Black and white jurors.
b. Contemporary Statements by the Decision Makers
The defense noted that prior to trial the solicitor had informed
the press that the victim's family was afraid to speak openly because
Patterson's family also lived in the area.10 6 There was apparently no
basis to believe that the victim's family had to fear, in any way, Patter-
Torrence killed three people. See State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 317-18 (S.C. 1991).
James Michael Charping brutally beat, raped, and tortured his victim. See State v. Charp-
ing, 437 S.E.2d 88, 89 (S.C. 1993). Ronald Smart stabbed two people to death. See State v.
Smart, 299 S.E.2d 686, 687 (S.C. 1982); State v. Smart, 262 S.E.2d 911 (S.C. 1980). Robert
South shot a police officer in the performance of his duties. See State v. South, 331 S.E.2d
775, 777 (S.C. 1985). Michael Sloan raped his victim, beat her head with an iron, and
stabbed her. See State v. Sloan, 298 S.E.2d 92, 93 (S.C. 1982).
100 See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Change Venue at exhibit A,
Patterson (No. 85-GS-32-526).
101 See id. at 2.
102 For some defendants, there was more than one trial. Professor Eisenberg, Patter-
son's statistical expert, however, counted multiple cases involving the same defendant as a
single case.




106 See Lisa Greene, Man Goes on Trial for His Life for Third Time Since '84 Slaying, THE
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 6, 1995, at Al.
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son's family, especially since the case already had gone to trial twice
without incident. The defense contended that the State obviously was
playing to the possible racist attitudes of potential jurors.10 7
Defense counsel presented evidence that the racism of the vic-
tim's widow had influenced the decision to seek the death penalty. In
a deposition in connection with her civil suit against the motel in
which she and Mr. Brooks had stayed, Mrs. Brooks revealed a deep-
seated antipathy toward Blacks:
Q: What did [the police] ask you about?
They asked me if it was a man, and I told them yes, it was a
man, and it was a black man. And they asked me the color, you
know, whether he was black, and I said yes, he was black.
A: That's what made me so afraid.
Q: Why would that make you afraid?
I am just totally afraid of them. I mean as long as they keep a
distance from me, I'm all right, but I don't want their hands on
A: me; I don't want anything, you know.
Q: This is black people generally, you mean?
A: Yes.' 08
c. Departures from Usual Procedures
Patterson's lawyers also presented evidence regarding the prose-
cution's use of peremptory strikes. For example, during Patterson's
first trial, the state used its peremptory strikes to obtain an all-white
jury. 0 9 Counsel also noted that there had been previous findings of
discriminatory intent in the use of peremptory challenges in capital
cases involving a Black defendant and white victim. Larry Gilbert and
J.D. Gleaton were tried twice before all-white juries after the State had
excluded all potential African American jurors. 10 In the sentencing
report filed with the South Carolina Supreme Court, the trial judge
107 See Motion to Impose Sanctions for Outrageous State Conduct at 1, Patterson (No.
93-GS-32-2519).
108 Deposition of Ruth Pruett Brooks at 29-30, Brooks v. Mid-Carolina Motor Inn, No.
3:85-2720-0 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). Ms. Brooks later testified in the civil suit that when she
was in the hospital, she made it clear that she only wanted white people to come into her
room. Her wishes extended to doctors and nurses:
A: [I] made sure there wasn't anybody come in the room, only somebody that
was white.
Q: And that was the doctor and the nurse?
A: Yes.
Id. at 31. Later, Ms. Brooks testified about two men she saw just after her husband was
shot. When asked if the men were white or Black, she answered, "White. I would have run
if they had been black." Id. at 72.
109 See State v. Patterson, 414 S.E.2d 155, 156 (S.C. 1992).
110 One commentator has noted that "[o]ften the only member of a racial minority
who participates in the process is the accused." Bright, supra note 4, at 443. There are few
Black prosecutors, especially at the highest levels. Jeffrey Pokorak has stated that there are
only 22 elected African American district attorneys in the country. SeeJeffreyJ. Pokorak,
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noted that the solicitor systematically had excluded Blacks from the
jury.1l
Patterson's counsel also presented evidence from other attorneys
practicing in Lexington County. This evidence included their obser-
vations of the State's use of peremptory strikes to exclude Blacks from
juries in criminal trials.112 Again, in addition to the anecdotal data,
Patterson's counsel offered statistical evidence supporting its asser-
tions regarding the State's use of its peremptory challenges. A statisti-
cal study by Professor William G. Jacoby of the Department of
Government and International Studies at the University of South Car-
olina, an expert in the field of quantitative methodology, examined
the solicitor's pattern of exercising peremptory strikes in Lexington
County capital trials and calculated that the probability that these
strikes occurred by chance was 1.93 x 10".113 That number is a deci-
mal point followed by sixteen zeroes and then a two (with rounding).
To put this in perspective, if the probability was one in a billion, that
number would be a decimal point followed by eight zeroes and then a
one. 11
4
Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CoP, NEuL L. REv.
1811, 1816 (1998).
111 See Motion to Prohibit Solicitor from Exercising Peremptory Strikes Against African
Americans, exhibit A at 10, Patterson (No. 93-GS-32-2519). Striking African American ju-
rors in capital cases is widespread. For example, in the Chatahooche Judicial Circuit in
Georgia-which has sent more people to death row than any other circuit in Georgia-
prosecutors have used 83% of their challenges against African Americanjurors. See Bright,
supra note 4, at 455-56.
112 For example, Richard Briebart testified as follows:
Q: Have you noticed what could be described as a usual practice on the part of
the Solicitor to strike blacks?
A: Where there is a black defendant, yes, sir.
Motion to Prohibit Solicitor from Exercising Peremptory Strikes Against African-Ameri-
cans, exhibit C at 131, Patterson (No. 93-GS-32-2519). Attorney Daniel A. Beck, another
experienced Lexington County attorney, offered similar testimony as to the practice of the
solicitor's office to strike blacks from juries:
Q: There were preemptory challenges systematically used by the Solicitor's of-
fice to exclude all black jurors in those cases?
A. Yes, sir. I believe very strongly that there were.
Id. exhibit D at 166.
H. Patterson McWhirter, the former Public Defender for Lexington County, testified:
A. No, I never had [in the fourteen years I was the public defender] a black on
a jury. I mean I'm not talkin' about a death penalty trial, but I'm talkin'
about [any] trial. I never had a black placed on the jury when I had a black
defendant.
Q: And that was the result of the solicitor's exercising peremptory challenges.
A- Right.
Id exhibit E at 5-6.
113 See id. exhibit F at 2.
114 Counsel also presented evidence that the prosecutor's reasons for challenging





The State accused Patterson of committing a relatively unaggra-
vated offense. The crime did not involve torture, multiple murder
victims, or even cold-blooded, calculated murder. Instead, this case
involved an immature nineteen-year-old delinquent who inadvertently
shot someone in the course of a mugging gone awry.
2. Dismissive Judicial Treatment of Patterson's Claim
Patterson's claim received no better treatment than that of Mat-
thews. Again, the court did not discuss the substantial evidence
before it. The Supreme Court of South Carolina simply stated:
Appellant contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion
to bar the solicitor from seeking the death penalty on the ground of
prosecutorial discrimination. Appellant contends the solicitor vio-
lated his rights under the 6th, 8th, 13th, and 14th amendments of
the U.S. Constitution and article I, §§ 3, 14, and 15 of the State
constitution. Appellant cited statistics on the solicitor's decision to
seek the death penalty in murder cases. He argues the solicitor has
sought the death penalty against white defendants only when the
circumstances are highly aggravated and never when the victim was
Black.
In McClskey v. Kemp, the United States Supreme Court held a
full evidentiary hearing should be held if a capital defendant can
establish a prima facie case that prosecutorial discretion in capital
cases has been tainted with discrimination. This claim is essentially
an equal protection claim. Appellant must provide "exceptionally
clear evidence" that the decision to prosecute was for an improper
reason. In McCleskey, the Court held similar statistics did not estab-
lish discrimination. Further, as we noted above, these statistics do
not take the defendant's race or the aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances into consideration. Appellant has not proven discrimi-
natory purpose by exceptionally clear evidence. Therefore, we hold
the trial judge did not err in denying appellant's motion.115
In neither case did the courts acknowledge that there was a differ-
ence between the statistical evidence presented in these cases and that
presented in MCleskey. Nor did the courts discuss the substantial cir-
cumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent in the prosecutors' of-
fices. Rather, both cases all but held that without direct evidence of
intent-without an admission that the prosecutor had sought the
death penalty because the defendant was Black and the victim was
white-a defendant could not bring a capital-sentencing racial dis-
crimination claim.
115 State v. Patterson, 482 S.E.2d 760, 767 (S.C. 1997) (citations omitted) (quoting
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
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C. Other Post-MCleskey Cases
Post-McCleskey capital cases in other states, as well as other cases in
South Carolina counties,"16 all have given little credence to claims of
county-level prosecutorial discrimination. This skepticism is appropri-
ate when the evidence supporting claims of prosecutorial discrimina-
tion is nonexistent or weak.' 17 Unfortunately, the brevity of the lower
courts' treatment of the issue often makes it difficult to discern what
evidence was before the court. In early post-McCleskey cases, it seems
fair to infer that the proof took the form of a statistical showing simi-
lar to that made in McCleskey.118 With respect to the more recent
cases, the uninformed reader might wonder: Why do these litigants
persist in making the same old, tired claim?" 9 Familiarity with the
facts behind some of these cases, however, raises quite different ques-
tions. Certainly the opinions in Matthews and Patterson give the reader
no hint of the substantial evidence of discriminatory intent that the
defendants had proffered.
The cases that do discuss the evidence of intent proffered by the
defendant uniformly dismiss that evidence as insufficient. The courts
treat these efforts to comply with McCleskey with varying levels of dis-
dain. Courts' reactions include seemingly misapprehending the na-
ture of the claim, dismissing discrimination allegations by relying on
general language in McCleskey about the need to respect prosecutorial
discretion, and claiming that county-level statistical data really do not
show what they purport to show-county-level discrimination. The dis-
tinction between systemic statistical showings and statistical showings
focused on a single decision maker largely has been ignored, despite
its central role in McCleskey's rationale. 120 Furthermore, even those
116 Studies reveal statistically significant racial effects in Anderson, Greenwood, and
Spartanburg counties, as well as in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, which consists of three coun-
ties. See Affidavit of Theodore Eisenberg, Bell v. Evatt, C/A No. 92-CP-04-722 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1992); Testimony of Theodore Eisenberg, Truesdale v. State, No. 91-CP-29-318 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1991); Testimony of Theodore Eisenberg, Elmore v. Evatt, No. 90-CP-24-1004
(S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
117 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 942 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ark. 1997); Underwood v. State, 708
So.2d 18, 37-38 (Miss. 1998); State v. Loza, 1997 WL 634348, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13,
1997); State v. Keene, 1996 WL 531606, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1996); People v.
Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 649 (Tex.
Crim. App.) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 557 (1997); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 51
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 90 (1997).
118 For a substantial collection of early post-McCleskey cases, see Baldus et al., supra note
6, at 375 nn.67, 69.
119 See, e.g., Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992); Meeks v. Singletary,
963 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Cain, 942 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (W.D. La.
1996), revd in part, affd in part, 125 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, No. 97-9567, 1998
WL 682167 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1998); Stewart v. Peters, 878 F. Supp. 1139, 1148-49 (N.D. Ill.
1995); Rogers v. Director, 864 F. Supp. 584, 598 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
120 See, e.g., Watkins v. Angelone, 1998 WL 2861, at *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 1998); United
States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp. 554, 559-60 (E.D. La. 1995); see also State v. Taylor, 669 So.2d
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cases that have taken most seriously claims based on county-wide statis-
tical data dismissed these claims on the ground that the statistical
analysis did not account for enough factors about the cases to assure
positively that racial effects were at work.
Perhaps prompted by a dissent, the Florida Supreme Court con-
ducted the most thorough analysis of any post-McCleskey racial discrim-
ination claim to date. In Foster v. State,'21 a defendant presented
statistical evidence of local prosecutorial discrimination by the Bay
County, Florida prosecutor's office:
In support of his claim, Foster proffered a study conducted by
his counsel of some of the murder/homicide cases prosecuted by
the Bay County State Attorney's Office from 1975 to 1987. Analyz-
ing the raw numbers collected, Foster concluded that defendants
whose victims were white were 4 times more likely to be charged
with first-degree murder than defendants whose victims were
black.'22
The Florida Supreme Court combined three approaches to the
data to reject the claim. The court initially and incorrectly equated
Foster's showing of statistical evidence that focused on one
prosecutorial office's decision making with McCleskey's statewide
showing: "Foster's claim suffers from the same defect [as McCles-
key's]. He has offered nothing to suggest that the state attorney's of-
fice acted with purposeful discrimination in seeking the death penalty
in his case."' 23 Perhaps recognizing that this explanation was not rec-
oncilable with Foster's offer of proof, the court acknowledged Foster's
effort to distinguish McCleskey: "Foster argues that McCleskey does not
foreclose his challenge because his evidence focuses solely on the
practices of one prosecutor's office, whereas the Baldus study con-
sisted of generalized statistics covering every aspect of Georgia's death
penalty scheme."' 24 The court responded to Foster's argument by in-
voking McCleskey's reference to wide prosecutorial discretion and the
need for "'exceptionally clear proof'" before inferring an abuse of dis-
364, unpublished app. at *29 (La. 1996) (dimissing, with extreme brevity, defendant's sta-
tistical data as contrary to McCleskey, despite the fact that the statistics focused specifically
on the East Baton Rouge Parish).
121 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992).
122 Id. at 463. The defendant's evidence also show that, of those defendants facing
first-degree murder charges, white-victim defendants were six times more likely to go to
trial, and that, of those defendants who went to trial, white-victim defendants were 26 times
more likely to be convicted of first-degree murder. See id. The court stated that such statis-
tical evidence did not implicate the prosecutor's decisionmaking- "The figures... cannot
be attributed to a decision by the Bay County State Attorney's Office and thus are not
relevant here." Id. at 464 n.9.
123 Id. at 463.
124 Id at 464.
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cretion. 125 The court then rejected Foster's proof because his statisti-
cal showing did not account for any of the nonracial variables that
could have explained the disparity.126 As the court reasoned, the dis-
parity was not "a significantly greater disparity than figures proffered
by the Baldus study which had taken into account numerous nonracial
variables."'
2 7
In State v. Taylor,128 the Missouri Supreme Court indicated that
county-level statistical data did not bear on the prosecutor's motive in
the defendant's case.' 29 It treated nonstatistical evidence of other acts
of discrimination by the prosecutor's office as irrelevant. 30 The de-
fendant relied in part on statistical evidence concerning first-degree
murder cases in the relevant county during the three years preceding
the imposition of his death sentence.' 31 He also relied on allegations
of bias by an assistant prosecutor involved in his original plea, allega-
tions of discrimination by the county prosecutors injury selection, al-
legations of racial slurs and employment discrimination by the
prosecutor's office, the State's unusual refusal to offer life without pa-
role in exchange for a guilty plea, and a study of racial disparity in
Missouri capital punishment cases covering 1977 to 1991.132
The court imposed extremely narrow strictures on the kind of
allegations that could contribute to a claim of prosecutorial discrimi-
nation, stating that the county-level study did "not show purposeful
discrimination or any effect on his case, specifically."' 33 It added that
"[t]he other allegations of discrimination within the prosecutor's of-
fice were irrelevant because they did not involve decision makers,
were remote in time, and did not show discriminatory purpose in his
case."1
34
In Lane v. State,'35 the defendant presented the Nevada Supreme
Court with a county-level study that allegedly established that the
county intentionally had sought the death penalty in a racially discrim-
inatory manner. 36 The court rejected the showing on the ground
that the study did not control for enough factors about the cases:
The survey's fatal flaw is that it fails to demonstrate that black and
white persons who are similarly situated are treated differently.
125 Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987)).
126 See id.
127 Id.
128 929 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).






135 881 P.2d 1358 (Nev. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 956 P.2d 88 (1998).
136 See id. at 1362.
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First, Lane's statistics do not sufficiently narrow the factors
which weigh into the prosecutor's decision to seek the death pen-
alty. While the survey does tend to show that the death penalty has
been sought more often for black non-felons than for white felons,
the survey fails to take into consideration the relative strengths and
weaknesses of those eighty-six cases, the individual characteristics of
the offenses, whether aggravating or mitigating circumstances were
present or absent, the nature of the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, whether plea bargains were offered and accepted, and
the individual characteristics and attitudes of each capital
defendant.
Without such vital information, we cannot determine whether
or to what extent race may have been implicated in the capital cases
involved in the survey. We therefore have no basis for holding that
there was a racially discriminatory purpose behind the Washoe
County District Attorney's decision to seek the death penalty in this
case.
13 7
Thus, although the court expressed a willingness at least to consider a
county-level statistical showing, it dismissed the showing as insuffi-
ciently complete.
The Supreme Court of California, in People v. McPeters,13 8 ex-
pressed a similar willingness to consider countywide data on race-of-
victim effects, but it seemed similarly critical of the particular study
proffered. McPeters, however, differs from most post-McCleskey cases in
that it involved a pre-trial motion for discovery. The Fresno Public
Defender Office had accumulated data and had correlated the race of
the victim to death sentences. These data seemed compelling on
their face: Although only one-third of all willful homicide victims were
white, "all death or life-without-parole sentences were meted out in
cases involving White victims."1 3 9 These data coupled with the modest
nature of the relief requested seemingly would have made the court
more inclined to accept the defendant's statistical data. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, however, denied the defendant's pretrial motion
for discovery of the prosecution's records relating to capital-charging
policies and criticized the study for not describing or analyzing the
facts or circumstances of the cases beyond race.
140
Although we have focused most of our attention on single deci-
sion maker statistical showings, courts have also dismissed another
subset of post-McCleskey racial discrimination claims with individual-
ized proof. Some litigants have used statewide data, combined with
undisputed evidence that other decisions in the defendant's case have
137 Id. at 1362-63.
138 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Cal. 1992).
139 Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
140 See id. at 843-44.
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rested on racial criteria. In Davis v. Greer,14 1 the Seventh Circuit re-
viewed a statistical study showing that: (1) a capital defendant in Illi-
nois was six times more likely to receive the death penalty if his victim
was white; and (2) a black defendant convicted of killing a white vic-
tim was 3.75 times as likely to receive the death penalty as a white
defendant convicted of killing a white victim. 1 42 The court held that
this study was insufficient to support an inference of discrimination
even when the prosecutor had decided to remove all African Ameri-
cans from the jury venire.1 43 The court failed to explain why the ra-
cial cleansing was not probative of racial bias in the decision to seek
death. In an even stronger case, involving statewide data, countywide
data, and admitted race discrimination injury selection, the Northern
District of Illinois was less cryptic, but equally unimpressed:
[The defendant] asks this Court to make a leap of logic that cannot
be made under the McCleskey standard: that there is a direct correla-
don between how the state uses its peremptories and the questions
whether the state seeks the death penalty in a racially discriminatory
manner or whether the jurors that ultimately serve use racial bias.
Admittedly, the unconstitutionality of discrimination in the use of
peremptories hinges in part on an assumption thatjurors might use
the race of the defendant or the victim in its decision. However, we
cannot leap from that proposition to the conclusion that the prose-
cution decided to seek or the jury imposed the death penalty on
racial grounds.14
III
CRITIQUE OF POST-cCLZESWY CASES: HAVE COURTS
ACCURATELY APPLIED EQUAL PROTECTION
PRINCIPLES?
This sampling of cases addressing post-McCleskey county-level
claims shows a range ofjudicial responses. The responses can be eval-
uated at two levels. First, at the doctrinal level, the cases raise the
question whether the courts are reasonably applying McCleskey to
county-level, prosecutor-specific discrimination claims, given the back-
ground of general equal protection doctrine. Here the answer seems
clear: the courts are less hospitable to such claims than they should
be. A second level of analysis, which is explored in the next section of
this Article, separates the question of ultimate proof of county-level
prosecutorial discrimination from the logically prior question con-
cerning the allocation of burdens of proof and persuasion. All other
141 13 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1994).
142 See id. at 1143.
143 See id. at 1143-44.
144 Williams v. Chrans, 742 F. Supp. 472, 495 (N.D. IlM. 1990).
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areas of discrimination treat these questions separately. Separating
these questions in the county-level selective-prosecution area would
allow a capital defendant who makes a reasonable showing of racial
effects to shift the burden of production to prosecutors, who have
unique knowledge of why they chose to seek death in some cases but
not others.
The cases recounted above show crucial misunderstandings of
what McCleskey does and does not hold. The most fundamental error
arises when courts infer that the failure of the statistically based attack
on racial effects in McCleskey dooms all subsequent equal protection
challenges to prosecutorial capital case decision making that rely on
evidence of racial patterns. 145 As discussed in Part I, this reading of
McCleskey is neither accurate nor consistent with broader equal protec-
tion doctrine. 146
One must also question courts that refuse to draw inferences of
prosecutorial-level discrimination in one case from prosecutorial be-
havior in other local cases. Cases such as Taylor hold that county-level
statistical data regarding prior cases do not bear on the prosecutor's
motive in a subsequent defendant's case. 147 McCleskey by no means
mandates this approach to statistical evidence. It merely holds that
statewide data, standing alone, are insufficiently connected to an individ-
ual defendant's case to create an inference of racial discrimination. 148
Beyond McCleskey, this ban on countywide data is inconsistent
with the treatment of similar evidence in other contexts. Consider,
for example, a government personnel officer who has refused to hire
every Black applicant over a period of years. A current Blackjob appli-
cant who offered such evidence likely would not be told that the ap-
parent prior pattern of race-based decision making was unrelated to
proving intentional discrimination in her case. The prior pattern
would be probative evidence. To treat it otherwise would be inconsis-
tent with Arlington Heights's instruction to conduct "a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able."' 49 The circumstantial nature of statistical patterns of prior be-
havior does not disqualify them from supporting a finding of
intentional discrimination. In some contexts, such as discrimination
145 See, e.g., United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 746 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing McCleskey as
embodying a "general rule that in cases involving discretionaryjudgments 'essential to the
criminal justice process,' statistical evidence of racial disparity is insufficient to infer that
prosecutors in a particular case acted with a discriminatory purpose"); Baldus et al., supra
note 6, at 374 (stating that McCleskey effectively terminated statistically based claims of ra-
cial discrimination in capital sentencing).
146 See supra Part I.0.
147 See supra text accompanying notes 122-28.
148 See supra Part I.B-C.
149 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977) (emphasis added).
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in jury panels, courts only require statistical evidence from other
cases.J50 When statistical evidence-even statewide statistical evi-
dence, but certainly countywide evidence-is combined with direct ev-
idence of other discriminatory acts by prosecutors and their offices, it
is difficult to see why additional kinds of evidence would be necessary.
Courts that recognize the relevance and probity of county-level
evidence rely on yet another misapprehension to reject capital de-
fendants' claims of prosecutorial discrimination. For example, while
the state supreme courts in Foster and Lane expressed willingness to
consider statistical evidence of county-level discrimination, they both
found the statistical showings to be inadequate because the showings
did not control for enough factors about the cases. 151 Stark racial ef-
fects, even though statistically improbable, would not suffice.
Under this view, defendants may need to analyze each homicide
case in the relevant county for the presence of racial factors, for the
presence of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, and for the
presence of other factors that legitimately might influence
prosecutorial decision making. But such an analysis would be impossi-
ble. Because a capital defendant enjoys a constitutional right to prof-
fer in mitigation "any aspect of [his] character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense,"' 52 defendants would have to hy-
pothesize, in each case, about all of the features that the prosecutor
might have found to be mitigating. Moreover, they would have to do
so with the minimal amount of information about cases that exists in
sources reasonably available to them.
As a preliminary matter, the post-McCleskey courts' insistence on
more detailed statistical showings may stem in part from the proof in
McCleskey. The comprehensive, sophisticated showing that McCleskey
rejected may have raised unrealistic expectations about the depth of
statistical evidence that one should expect in the mass of capital
cases.15 Some courts have commented that the county-level showings
in their cases controlled for fewer factors than the statewide showing
in McCleskey.a54 However, it is not feasible to expect a typical, individ-
ual defendant to control for hundreds of factors about a case-McCles-
key was an exceptional defendant in this regard. In addition, one
150 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 500-01 (1977).
151 See supra text accompanying notes 120-21, 131.
152 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); accord McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 441 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1988);
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
153 AsJustice Brennan noted in McCleskey. "McCleskey presents evidence that is far and
away the most refined data ever assembled on any system of punishment, data not readily
replicated through casual effort." McGleskeyv. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 341 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
154 See, e.g., Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 464 (Fla. 1992).
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reasonably cannot expect county-level attacks, particularly outside
populous urban areas, to include hundreds of variables in the analysis.
To include hundreds of variables in a multiple-regression analysis sim-
ilar to that in McCleskey requires thousands of cases.155 The Baldus
study in McCleskey included over 2,000 cases, 156 but could do so only
because it was a statewide study in a state with many capital cases. To
insist that prosecutorial discrimination studies control for many fac-
tors about a case, while requiring that they be conducted at the county
level and yield statistically significant results, asks the impossible of
most defendants, and of all defendants outside large urban areas.
Moreover, in urban areas where the numbers might be large enough
for such controls, more than one decision maker would be the norm;
so in another sense, these studies would be less probative of the likeli-
hood that racial motivation affected the decision to seek the death
penalty for an individual defendant.
Insistence on massive controls of factors about cases is not the
norm in other discrimination areas. In McCleskey itself, the Court
cited with approval Bazemore v. Friday'57 for the proposition that the
Court "has accepted statistics in the form of multiple-regression analy-
sis to prove statutory violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964."158 Bazemore took a reasonable attitude towards the compre-
hensiveness of statistical analysis required to establish discrimination.
Indeed, it expressly eschewed requiring a plaintiff to include all rele-
vant variables in a statistical model and stated:
The Court of Appeals erred in stating that petitioners' regres-
sion analyses were "unacceptable as evidence of discrimination," be-
cause they did not include "all measurable variables thought to have
an effect on salary level." The court's view of the evidentiary value
of the regression analyses was plainly incorrect. While the omission
of variables from a regression analysis may render the analysis less
probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent
some other infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the major
factors "must be considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimina-
tion." Normally, failure to include variables will affect the analysis'
probativeness, not its admissibility.
Importantly, it is clear that a regression analysis that includes
less than "all measurable variables" may serve to prove a plaintiff's
case. A plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove discrimination
with scientific certainty; rather, his or her burden is to prove dis-
155 HELENA CHMURA KRAEMER & SUE THIEMANN, How MANY SUBJECTS? STATISTICAL
POWER ANAL-SIS IN RESEARCH 65 (1987).
156 See McCkeskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
157 478 U.S. 385 (1986).




crimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Whether, in fact,
such a regression analysis does carry the plaintiffs' ultimate burden
will depend in a given case on the factual context of each case in
light of all the evidence presented by both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. However, as long as the court may fairly conclude, in light
of all the evidence, that it is more likely than not that impermissible
discrimination exists, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail.'
59
One court has extended Bazemore's willingness to consider statistical
analyses that do not account for all relevant variables to statistical
showings other than regression analysis.1
60
Perhaps most importantly, those studies that have been able to
control for many factors in capital cases suggest that even when all
feasible factors are controlled, the racial effects usually do not disap-
pear. The Baldus study in McCleskey, the detailed study of Philadel-
phia cases in this Symposium,' 6' state-sponsored studies in New
Jersey, 6 2 and studies by Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro 163 all con-
trolled for factors that are beyond the ability of capital defendants
faced with analyzing only dozens or hundreds of homicide cases. Yet
racial effects do not disappear in these most comprehensive studies.
Instead, these effects may even increase in strength.164 Thus, it is rea-
sonable to treat statistically significant showings of racial effects seri-
ously even when these effects have not controlled for all potentially
relevant factors about capital cases. Of course, that does not mean
that in any individual case, there will never be factors that have caused
spurious racial effects. The question is only whether to presume that
greater controls would eliminate racial effects, and to that query, the
older, more comprehensive studies offer a clear answer: No.
159 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400-01 (footnote and citations omitted).
160 See Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 288 n.24 (D.D.C. 1996)
("While the regression analyses considered in Bazemore do differ from Plaintiffs' statistical
sample study in this case, the Supreme Court's discussion is still helpful, because it directly
addresses the validity of an expert statistical analysis that fails to incorporate all relevant
information.").
161 See Baldus et al., RacialDiscrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 Coi.NELL L. Rav. 1638
(1998).
162 See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1063-65 (N.J. 1992); Baldus et al., supra note 6,
at 405-13.
163 See GRoss & MAURO, supra note 4, at 43-92. This study also contains a useful discus-
sion of the likely effect of omitted variables. See id. at 97.




PROPERLY ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PRODUCTION:
STATISTICAL AND OTHER COUNTy-LEVEL EVIDENCE
As ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE
One oversight that exacerbates problems with existing judicial
analyses of county-level discrimination claims is the failure to separate
the burden of production from the ultimate burden of persuasion.
Courts tend to act as if the capital defendant alleging discrimination
must establish the existence of discrimination. They rarely discuss the
concept of a prima facie case that shifts the burden of production to
the alleged wrongdoer. Regardless of the strength of his initial show-
ing, courts are making the capital defendant bear the full burden of
producing evidence, as well as the burden of persuasion traditionally
allocated to a civil movant. In Matthews, Patterson, and McPeters, the
courts deemed the defendants' strong statistical and other showings
insufficient-even to warrant discovery that would have provided use-
ful, and perhaps definitive, information about prosecutorial decision
making. This one-sided approach to the capital defendant's burdens
is inconsistent both with the theory of how burdens of production
normally are allocated and with how the Supreme Court has allocated
these burdens in other areas of discrimination.
A. The Theory of Burdens of Production
Edmund Morgan's classic discussion of presumptions notes that
some presumptions "have their origin in considerations of the com-
parative convenience with which the parties can produce evidence of
the fact in issue."' 6 5 This approach to presumptions squares both with
common sense and with more modem notions of efficiency. The lit-
gant with easier access to information ought in general to be responsi-
ble for producing that information. The capital defendant who
makes a prima facie case of discrimination should be entitled to a
favorable presumption until the prosecutor offers evidence to rebut
the prima facie case.
In county-level discrimination cases, the prosecutor's office
clearly enjoys easier access to the most accurate information available.
To make a colorable showing of prosecutorial discrimination a capital
defendant must search public records and construct a list of homicide
cases that might have been death eligible. After constructing the list,
the defendant must ascertain, as best he can, information about each
case. Such information, although fundamental to the defendant's
claim, is not always readily available from the public record. Some-




times counsel must gather even the most basic facts, such as the race
of the defendant or victim, from other sources. Thus, even to make a
simple statistical statement, such as "the prosecutor's office never has
sought the death penalty in this county in a Black-victim case," can
involve enormous amounts of intensive archival work. Systematically
extracting other pertinent information-the presence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the relation between the defendant and
the victim, the defendant's prior criminal record, and the details of
the crime-can be extremely difficult. Furthermore, because defend-
ants may offer, and prosecutors may consider, nonstatutory mitigating
factors, one reasonably cannot expect the capital defendant to know
precisely what moved a prosecutor in other homicide cases to seek or
not to seek death.
In contrast to the sometimes insurmountable burdens that capital
defendants face in constructing colorable claims of discrimination,
county-level prosecutors that face discrimination charges have per-
sonal knowledge of all relevant factors influencing the decision
whether to seek death. Capital defendants who make showings as
strong as those made in Patterson, Matthews, and other cases should
benefit from a production-shifting presumption that requires the
prosecutor to come forward with evidence about the factors influenc-
ing his decision making.
B. Allocation of Burdens of Production in Other Discrimination
Cases
A reasonable prima facie standard for county-level prosecutorial
discrimination claims would be a standard consistent with other dis-
criminationjurisprudence. In both constitutional and statutory cases,
the Supreme Court allows reasonable initial showings of racial effects
to shift the burden of production to the alleged discriminator. This
burden shifting is found in the constitutional areas ofjury selection 166
and peremptory challenges, 167 as well as in the statutory Title VII
context.168
McCleskey did distinguish the nature of the capital-sentencing de-
cision from prior holdings that accepted statistical proof injury selec-
tion and Title VII cases.
166 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497-98 (1977).
167 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986).
168 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1993); United States Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983); Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 576-77 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); see
generally Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rheto-




[T] he capital sentencing decision, and the relationship of the statis-
tics to that decision, are fundamentally different from the corre-
sponding elements in the venire-selection or Title VII cases. Most
importantly, each particular decision to impose the death penalty is
made by a petit jury selected from a properly constituted venire.
Each jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution re-
quires that its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors
that vary according to the characteristics of the individual defen-
dant and the facts of the particular capital offense. Thus, the appli-
cation of an inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific
decision in a trial and sentencing simply is not comparable to the
application of an inference drawn from general statistics to a spe-
cific venire-selection or Tide VII case. In those cases, the statistics
relate to fewer entities, and fewer variables are relevant to the chal-
lenged decisions. 169
The basis upon which McCleskey distinguished these other areas
from capital sentencing, however, is inapplicable to county-level at-
tacks on prosecutorial discrimination. In county-level discrimination
claims, the Court's concerns about attacks on decentralized decision
making are irrelevant. An inference from statistics about the prior
behavior of the same prosecutor or prosecutor's office is not the same
as the inference needed in MCleskey, which was from statewide gen-
eral statistics to a local decision not necessarily related to those statis-
tics. As in the jury venire selection and Tite VII cases, county-level
statistics relate to fewer entities. In fact, they relate to only one person
or entity.
The smaller number of decision makers creates two crucial differ-
ences. First, the inference that the defendant himself experienced ra-
cial discrimination becomes stronger if we know that his prosecutor, at
least some of the time, engaged in racial discrimination. Second,
when the challenged decision focuses on one person or entity, that
person or entity may rebut incorrect inferences about the decision.
This type of rebuttal is not possible with statewide data because no
one person or entity is privy to the information that could rebut the
inference.
Thus, the concern about death-seeking decision making involv-
ing more variables is all that remains of McCleskey's uniqueness. If one
assumes that the decision to seek death involves more factors than the
decision employed in Title VII cases, then this concern remains at
least partially intact. But the studies discussed above, 170 which do con-
tain many variables, suggest that controlling for multiple variables
does not eliminate racial effects. So it is unlikely that racial effects in
169 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-95 (1987) (citation and footnote omitted).
170 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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simpler studies are merely artifacts of failing to control for more vari-
ables. Further, there is no support for a contrary presumption. Given
the available data, courts should not shield discrimination from effec-
tive review simply because it occurs in a more complex setting than
heretofore encountered.
C. A Modest Proposal
Decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence in virtually all other ar-
eas of discrimination, as well as intimations in county-level selective-
prosecution cases, support ruling that a reasonable prima facie case of
discrimination shifts the burden of production to the alleged discrimi-
nator. In Washington v.Johnson,17' the Fifth Circuit describes a process
in which the prosecutor was forthcoming with evidence about the ba-
ses for his decision to seek death in the defendant's case:
In his state petition for habeas relief, Petitioner raised the
claim of purposeful racial discrimination. The State responded
with an affidavit of Bill Turner, the Brazos County district attorney,
who made the decision to charge Washington with capital murder.
Turner affirmed that race does not play a role in charging deci-
sions, and that in Washington's case, capital murder and the death
penalty were sought because of the nature of the murder, commit-
ted in the course of a robbery, and because of Washington's past
violence and statements warning of possible future violence. Addi-
tionally, the affidavit set forth the capital murder cases in which
Turner had been involved and the sentences imposed. Washington,
though afforded the opportunity to cross examine Turner at the
state habeas hearing on the contents of the affidavit, declined to
question him.172
After a prima facie case is established, the prosecutor could furnish
similar evidence about relevant homicide cases in which death had
and had not been sought. In Foster v. State,'73 Chief Justice Barkett, in
a concurrence and dissent, suggested the following standard' 74 for
capital cases:
A party asserting racial discrimination in the State's decision to seek
the death penalty should make a timely objection and demonstrate
on the record that the discrimination exists and that there is a
strong likelihood it has influenced the State to seek the death pen-
alty. Such discrimination conceivably could be based on the race of
the victim or on the race of the defendant. Once the trial court
171 90 F.3d 945 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1259 (1997).
172 Id. at 954.
173 614 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1992).
174 ChiefJustice Barkett proposed this standard for determining violations of the Flor-
ida State Constitution, but we think it aptly describes the standard that federal equal pro-
tection law as a whole mandates.
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determines that the initial burden has been met by the defendant,
the burden then shifts to the State to show that the practices in
question are not racially motivated. If the trial court determines
that the State does not meet that burden, the State then is prohib-
ited from seeking the death penalty in that case. 175
A burden-shifting rule is not inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's ruling against McCleskey. In a statewide challenge, as in Mc-
Cleskey, one cannot expect meaningful rebuttal evidence because the
challenged decision makers are so diffuse. At the county level, how-
ever, there is little reason not to require rebuttal evidence. Moreover,
if a prosecutor failed to rebut a defendant's showing, that would not
jeopardize the death penalty in masses of cases, but only would re-
quire the reversal of the death sentences that he had sought.
Interestingly enough, even though Foster had not proffered
county-level evidence, ChiefJustice Barkett explained the kind of evi-
dence that a prima facie case would include: statistical evidence in a
particular jurisdiction and "other information that could suggest dis-
crimination, such as the resources devoted to the prosecution of cases
involving white victims. . . , and the general conduct of a state attor-
ney's office, including hiring practices and the use of racial epithets
and jokes."'1 7 6 This type of evidence, of course, is exactly the kind of
information proffered in the cases discussed in this Article and uni-
formly dismissed by lower courts as insufficient. It is also the kind of
evidence routinely accepted in other kinds of equal protection cases.
To be specific, we propose that if the defendant establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination, by which we mean a showing by
statistical or other evidence that discrimination is more likely than not
to have occurred, then the burden of production shifts to the prosecu-
tor, who must then articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for seeking death. If the prosecutor fails to assert such a reason,
the defendant prevails. If the prosecutor produces evidence creating
a genuine issue of fact, then the defendant, retaking the burden of
persuasion, must establish discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence.
CONCLUSION
It is remarkable that in ten years of post-McCleskey litigation, not a
single claimant has prevailed. In any discrimination case, judges are
reluctant to find intentional discrimination by state officials. 17 7 Never-
theless, in other classes of race cases, courts do find intentional dis-
175 Foster, 614 So. 2d at 468 (Barkett, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 Id. at 467.
177 See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CoRNu. L. REv. 1151, 1181 (1991).
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crimination with less evidence than has been accumulated in some of
these cases. Why are courts so hostile to post-McCleskey county-level
claims?
One might wonder if reluctance to find intentional discrimina-
tion is especially strong in the case of prosecutors, whose race-neutral
exercise of discretion should be a lynchpin of our criminal justice sys-
tem. While this reluctance may explain the post-McCleskey cases in
part, courts have not exhibited nearly the same reluctance to find
prosecutors guilty of Batson violations. In other contexts as well,
courts have not treated prosecutors as if they were above the law.
178
Nor is the suggestion that there have been no post-McCleskey win-
ners because there has been no racial discrimination in the decisions
to seek the death penalty a plausible hypothesis. Many studies show
capital case racial effects. Moreover, if prosecutors commonly use
race to select juries, why would we expect that they are somehow more
colorblind in their decisions to seek the death penalty?
Whatever the source of the lower courts' reluctance, one manifes-
tation of this reluctance is their focus on statements in McCleskey about
high evidentiary standards for race-based claims in capital cases, and
their corresponding inattention to the context of these statements.
After holding that McCleskey had presented no evidence of discrimi-
nation in his case, the Court in McCleskey emphasized the broad dis-
cretion of prosecutors and the need for solid proof.'79 Although
courts rely on this emphasis to reject post-McCleskey claims, 180 the
Supreme Court's expressed concern does not preclude race-based at-
tacks on prosecutorial decision making.
Thus, the question in Matthews, Patterson, and cases from other
states is not whether McCleskey precludes their form of the race-based
challenge, but rather what level of proof should trigger the imposition
of a burden on county-level decision makers.
178 See Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
272-76 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492-96 (1991).
179 The Court in McCleskey states:
[T]he policy considerations behind a prosecutor's traditionally "wide dis-
cretion" suggest the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend
their decisions to seek death penalties "often years after they were made."
Moreover, absent far stronger proof, it is unnecessary to seek such a rebut-
tal, because a legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the decision is
apparent from the record: McCleskey committed an act for which the
United States Constitution and Georgia laws permit imposition of the death
penalty.
... Implementation of these laws necessarily requires discretionary judg-
ments. Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we
would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the
discretion has been abused.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296-97 (1987) (citations omitted).
180 See, e.g., Foster, 614 So. 2d at 464.
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A final reason for hostility to post-McCleskey claims, in both South
Carolina and elsewhere,' 8 ' is that courts often are reluctant to discuss
or even describe evidence of racial bias in criminal cases. For exam-
ple, the South Carolina Supreme Court recently reversed the convic-
don and death sentence in State v. Manning.8 2 Manning is African
American, and the victim, a state-trooper, was white.'8 3 After a mis-
trial (at which the jury hung 10-2 for acquittal), the prosecution re-
quested and obtained a change of venue, arguing in effect that there
were too many potential Black jurors in Dillon County for the State to
obtain a fair trial.'8 4 The trial judge, a former police officer, granted
the motion and transferred the case to a county with a significantly
smaller Black population than Dillon County.8 5 The state court re-
versed, finding the trial judge's decision to grant the change of venue
an abuse of discretion.' 8 6 However, the court never mentioned the
racial basis of the State's request. The South Carolina Supreme Court
has avoided other thorny racial issues in capital cases, 18 7 and as Coker
v. Georgia'1 suggests, the Supreme Court sometimes may do the
same.
189
Fear of labeling state officials racist, the need for prosecutorial
discretion, and general reluctance to address racial claims all may fuel
the doctrinal missteps in post-McCleskey county-level cases. An under-
standing of courts' reluctance is not, however, a reason to condone
such action. Judges, especially federal judges, enjoy constitutionally
protected independence precisely because they must make unpopular
and difficult decisions. In the proud modem history of the judiciary,
judges' finest hours have come by challenging discrimination rather
181 Other state courts have shown a similar reluctance to address similar issues. See
Bright, supra note 4, at 471. For example, in Isaacs v. State, 355 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. 1987), the
court held that the trial judge should have recused himself because of his involvement in a
motion to disqualify. See id. at 646. The court, however, failed to mention that the motion
was motivated by the judge's record of racial discrimination. See Bright, supra note 4, at
471. As another example, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed two capital cases without
mentioning that the prosecutors had used racial slurs to refer to Black citizens, systemati-
cally excluded Blacks from juries, and refused to plea bargain in Black-defendant/white-
victim cases. See id.
182 495 S.E.2d 191 (S.C. 1997).
183 See Final Brief of Appellant at 3, Manning (No. 95-CP-0629).
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See Manning, 495 S.E.2d at 195-96.
187 See State v. Arthur, 374 S.E.2d 291 (S.C. 1988). The trial judge made the comment
that the mentally retarded defendant, who was African American, would have been "better
off under slavery, because at least then he would have had somebody to take care of him."
Brief of Appellant, Arthur (No. 22924).
188 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
189 Cf. Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986), modied and reh'g denied, 809
F.2d 750, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
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than sheltering it.190 It would be ironic if they now were to afford
racial discrimination its greatest shelter, through heightened burdens
of proof, in cases involving life and death.
190 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); JACK BASS, UN-
LIKELY HEROES (1981).
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